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Does Continuity Allow For
Emergence?
An Emergentist Reading Of Peirce’s Evolutionary Thought
Maria Regina Brioschi
 
1. Emergence: The “Living Influence” of a Concept*1
As many have remarked in the last two decades, the notion of “emergence” has been
receiving renewed attention in various debates:  from evolutionary biology to social
sciences, as well as in cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind.2 Overall,  this new
interest  can be  related  to  the  (supposed)  explanatory  function in  complex  systems
studies and to the possibility of a “non-reductive physicalism” (Crane 2001: 207). As
Bennett-Hunter has recently recalled:
In the broadest possible terms, the concept of emergence is supposed to describe
what happens when systems reach a certain level of complexity, at which point
‘new’ properties or entities are said to emerge. […] On the one hand, there has to be
an  important  connection  between  the  system,  from  which  the  phenomena
[properties  or  entities]3 emerge,  and  the  phenomena themselves.  On  the  other
hand, however, in order to count as emergent, phenomena have also to be novel
with respect to the system out of which they supposedly emerge. (Bennett-Hunter
2015: 305)
Accordingly,  the  notion  of  “emergence”  has  been  adopted  as  a  keystone  of  “non-
reductive physicalism,” since it enables to disclose a “via media between the extremes of
radical  dualism  and  reductionism,”  according  to  Timothy  O’Connor.  The  author
continues:
This middle road consists in the claim that the phenomenon in question is at once
grounded in and yet emergent from the underlying material structure with which it
is associated. At various times, this claim has been made with respect to the so-
called secondary qualities, biological life, and, most commonly of all, consciousness.
(O’Connor 1994: 91)
Although it is possible to point to the two general features of the concept of emergence
listed above, there is no common definition or definite meaning of it, nor is there a
Does Continuity Allow For Emergence?
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XI-2 | 2019
1
specific  correspondence  in  the  usage  of  the  concept  among  different  scholars  and
disciplines. Indeed, one of the main problems related to current debates on emergence
is how to find a coherent framework in which to develop research. 
To unravel this tangled situation, some distinctions have been made that are useful for
ordering problems generally involved in emergentism. Among them, two distinctions
stand out and are nowadays generally accepted and assumed in contemporary debates.
The  first  is  the  difference  between  an  epistemological and  an  ontological concept  of
emergence (and emergent phenomena), and the second is between a weak and a strong
sense of emergence.4 The first distinction depends on the answer given to the following
question: “Is emergence an objective feature of the world or is it merely in the eye of
the beholder?”5 Accordingly, from an epistemological perspective “emergence” refers
to a category characterizing our models of representation or theories of nature and, as
a consequence, can even be construed as an effect of our limited patterns of knowledge.
On  the  contrary,  from  an  ontological  viewpoint,  “emergence”  denotes  the  real
occurrence of  some “qualitative novelty.”6 Consequently,  the emergent phenomena 7
are considered as real components of the world, irreducible to the prior level from
which they appear. 
The  second  distinction  (between  weak  and  strong  emergence),  suggested  first  by
Mark A. Bedau in 1997,8 and revisited and further expanded by David Chalmers in 2006,
can be expressed as follows: we speak of a weak emergent phenomenon when “the
high-level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, but truths concerning that
phenomenon  are  unexpected given  the  principles  governing  the  low-level  domain,”
while we detect a strong emergent phenomenon when “the high-level phenomenon
arises  from the  low-level  domain,  but  truths  concerning  that  phenomenon are  not
deducible even in principle from truths in the low-level domain” (Chalmers 2006: 244;
italics mine). Thus, weak emergent phenomena are unexpected and unpredictable, yet
deducible from the low-level domain’s laws. Their unpredictability lies indeed in the
fact that, although at the high-level any global/complex behavior is constituted by/
reducible to the low-level domain, these low-level interactions are intertwined in such
a  complex  structure  that  it  makes  impossible  a  “simple”  explanation  of  high-level
phenomena,  and therefore their  predictability.  This  notion of  “weak emergence” is
usually adopted in the description of complex systems,  while the notion of  “strong
emergence” is used in philosophical contexts. The most notable phenomenon to which
it has been applied is that of consciousness. 
To sum up the main claims distinctive of the strong emergentist approach, which are
also indicative of the problems implied by it, we can adopt Jeagwon Kim’s overview,
slightly  modified  in  accordance  to  the  forehand.9 Thus,  on  the  whole,  we  can
summarize Emergentism as a doctrine based on: 
1.  Systemic  perspective.  The  emergence  of  complex  higher-level  phenomena  (proper
ontological  entities  and/or  new  structural  configurations  with  a  high-level  of
complexity,  from  the  coming  together  of  the  low-levels  entities;  and/or  emergent
properties not consequent from those of the prior, lower-levels) – W & S emergence;
2. Unpredictability. An essential feature is the unpredictability of emergent phenomena
(a phenomenon can be called “emergent” if and only if the information, properties and
laws of the low-level cannot predict it in principle) – W & S emergence;
3.  Unexplainability  and irreducibility  of  emergent  phenomena.  The emergent phenomena
cannot  be  epistemologically  explained  in  terms  of  their  low-level  domains,  nor
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ontologically reducible to them – S emergence only;
4.  Downward  causation.  The  emergent  phenomena  are  not  only  irreducible  to  lower
levels, but exercise their own causal powers both at their level and further down on
their lower, constituent levels – S emergence only.
Far from an exhaustive account of emergentism, these features are useful as pins to
stick into the map of emergentism in order to orient ourselves in current and past
debates. Furthermore, it has recently been pointed out how the most controversial, as
well  as  the most  crucial,  points  to  clarify,  in  order to  make theories  of  emergence
stronger, is a “positive characterization of emergence.” Namely, a characterization that
offers an explanation of  “irreducibility” and also of  “downward” causation (cf.  Kim
1999; cf. points 3, 4). Many lines of investigation can be pursued to clarify these issues;
in this  paper I  will  adopt both a historical  and philosophical-critical  perspective.  A
historical one because British Emergentism is usually interpreted as the first exposition
of a strong notion of emergence (cf. Chalmers 2006: 244). This direction has even been
advocated in current  debates,  as  Kim states:  “Any account of  emergence,  I  believe,
should show significant continuity with the concept that the British emergentists of
the early 20th Century, such as Alexander, Morgan, and Broad, had in mind […].” (Kim
2006:  548).  And  a  philosophical-critical  one  because  a  reconstruction  of  some  key
concepts of British Emergentism, combined with classical pragmatists’ approaches and
issues (Peirce’s in particular), can lead to an elucidation of the philosophical problems
related to both a positive description of emergence and downward causation.
 
2. From Emergentism to Pragmatism and back
2.1. Historical Examination
“British Emergentism” is the label usually applied to three British philosophers of the
early 20th Century who built their systems of thought upon the notion of “emergence,”
thereby denoting the dynamical relationship of the different layers of reality: Conwy
Lloyd Morgan (1852-1936), Samuel Alexander (1859-1838), and Charlie Dunbar Broad
(1887-1971).10 With their major works, Alexander’s Space, Time and Deity (1920), Lloyd
Morgan’s Emergent Evolution (1923), and Broad’s The Mind and its Place in Nature (1925),
each tried to “offer an alternative to mechanism and vitalism by introducing a third
theory called emergentism” (Stephan 1992: 25), based upon the following assumptions
(cf. McLaughlin 1992: 49-51): (a) everything is made of matter (i.e., elementary material
particles); (b) these particles are organized in levels hierarchically ordered on the basis
of their complexity, and to each of them corresponds a special science (in order: to the
physical level/Physics, to the chemical level/Chemistry, to the biological level/Biology
and the psychological level/Psychology); (c) each level is made up of the lower ones,
though its  properties  are  not  reducible  to  them (a  certain  structural  configuration
indeed implies certain specific causal powers/laws different from level to level);  (d)
those “emergent laws” also have an impact on the lower levels, with what has been
called downward causation.  Their common efforts were so successful  that from the
1920s to the 1960s philosophical debates on emergentism notably multiplied, and the
category of emergence became widespread, largely adopted, or at least discussed.11 
As the chronology clearly indicates, Peirce could not have read those works during his
life. And, although Lloyd Morgan was invited to give lessons in Boston, New York and
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Chicago in 1895-1896, there is no indication that Peirce knew him or his studies, which
were  mainly  devoted  to  comparative  psychology  before  the  formulation  of  his
emergentist  theory.  As  further  evidence  of  Peirce’s  lack  of  connections  with
emergentism  –  Goudge  highlighted  in  1973  –  Peirce  never  adopts  the  notion  of
“emergence” or “emergent” in a technical manner in his writings (Goudge 1973: 144).
On the contrary, as it is well known, John Dewey and especially George Herbert Mead
used the notion of emergence, and, for this reason, their thoughts have often been
considered as “emergentist” or at least comparable to those theories (cf.  Blitz 1992;
Stephan 1999; El-Hani & Pihlström 2002; Cherlin 2015).12 Before examining in detail the
extent to which classical pragmatists considered British Emergentism, it is worthwhile
to  note  that  Lloyd Morgan,  Alexander  and Broad never  looked at  pragmatism as  a
significant source of ideas, nor as a benchmark for developing their thoughts. On the
whole, they never took into account pragmatism as a philosophical movement, but all
of them held in great esteem the work of William James, especially as a psychologist.13 
If  we then move on to  the  historical  reconstruction of  pragmatists’  connections  to
emergentism,14 the  key  figures  who  explicitly  took  into  account  emergentism  are
Ferdinand C. S. Schiller, John Dewey, and especially George H. Mead. Indeed, the three
of them either adopt an “emergentist” terminology in their writings, or took part in
emergentism’s debates, though not in a univocal sense. For instance, in Experience and
Nature Dewey evaluates his  own account of  life  and the mind-body problem as “an
attempt to contribute to what has come to be called an ‘emergent’ theory of mind”
(Dewey 1925:  271);  Schiller  carefully  scrutinizes  the  concept  of  “emergence”  in  his
essay “Creation, Emergence, Novelty” (1930),15 and, in a more crucial way, Mead adopts
the concept of emergence as pivotal in his The Philosophy of the Present, underlying the
social character of the self, its relation to language, and the connection of the present
to the past. In the “Introduction” of this posthumous book, Arthur E. Murphy mentions
emergentism as a primary source of Mead’s thought. He states:
The third and perhaps the dominant strain in these lectures, however, is derived
neither  from  pragmatism  nor  from  research  science,  but  forms  part  of  that
philosophy of nature which will no doubt be regarded as the characteristic contribution
of the 1920’s in Anglo-American philosophy. Alexander’s Space, Time and Deity was the
pioneer  work  in  this  transition  from  problems  of  knowledge  –  of  “realism,”
“pragmatism”  and  “subjectivism” –  to  speculations  about  space  and  time  and
finally to metaphysics and the categories. (Murphy 1932: xiv; italics mine)16
A few pages later John Dewey, in the Prefatory Remarks, makes a very helpful comment
both from a historical perspective and a theoretical one:
Since his problem was (and that long before the words “emergent evolution” were
heard), essentially that of the emergence of the new and its ultimate incorporation
in  a  recognized  and  now  old  world,  one  can  appreciate  how  much  more
fundamentally he took the doctrine of emergence than have most of those who
have played with the idea. (Dewey 1932: xxxviii)
What  Dewey wants  to  stress  here  is  the  originality  of  Mead’s  thought,  but  he  also
enlightens two fundamental aspects of our brief historical reconstruction of Classical
Pragmatism and British Emergentism. 1) During the twenties, especially in the Anglo-
American  areas,  debates  on  emergence  and  the  emergentist  “vocabulary”  were  so
widely diffused that Murphy defines the notion of “emergence” as a “catchword” of the
period  (Murphy  1932:  xi).  Accordingly,  the  pragmatists  who  lived  in  that  period
compared  their  thoughts  with  this  “emergent”  mainstream,  critically  evaluated  its
notions, and sometimes adopted its jargon as well, as was the case for Mead, albeit with
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some modifications. 2) According to Dewey, one of the core topics of emergentism (the
emergence of the new and its encounter with the old) can be traced in Mead’s thought
long before it  became preeminent in British Emergentism, and this – together with
Schiller’s criticism of emergence – leads us toward a more theoretical consideration of
the connections of emergentism and pragmatism. Accordingly, in the next paragraph I
will  try  to  develop  the  hypothesis,  suggested  by  Dewey’s  quote,  that  Classical
Pragmatists and British Emergentists can be viewed as two different, possible answers
to  the  same  range  of  problems  and  issues  inherited  from  the  past  and  especially




Overall,  the  main  reason  why  Dewey  and  Mead  have  been  often  compared  to  or
considered  together  with  British  Emergentists  lies  on  the  latters’  non-reductive
materialism.17 As Kim states: 
Classical  emergentists  like  Morgan  and  Alexander  thought  of  themselves  as
occupying  a  moderate  intermediate  position  between  the  extremes  of
“mechanistic”  reductionism  on  the  one  hand  and  explicit  dualisms  like
Cartesianism and neo-vitalism on the other. […] It is evident that emergentism is a
form of what is now standardly called “non-reductive materialism,” a doctrine that
aspires to position itself as a compromise between physicalist reductionism and all-
out dualisms. (Kim 1999: 4)
And the same intermediate position can also be advocated for Classical pragmatists,
considering  their  strong  opposition  to  any  dualism  or  Cartesianism  and  their
consequent, radical understanding of mind and matter. As Dewey’s reflection testifies
to: “There is neither a sudden jump from the merely organic to the intellectual, nor is
there complete assimilation of the latter to primitive modes of the former” (Dewey
1930:  220).18 More  in  detail,  we  can  identify  two  key-concepts  associated  to  both
classical pragmatism and British Emergentism: 
(a) Mind in Evolution. Classical pragmatists intersect the line of thought of emergentism
at the very point where emergentism is extremely appealing still today: the mind-body
problem.19 They are indeed among the first who tried to philosophically re-think mind
in  an  evolutionary  framework,  in  continuity  with  the  organic  world  but  without
denying its specificity or reducing its laws to the previous ones. In this regard, Goudge
noticed in 1973:
The  pragmatists  were  the  first  group  of  philosophers  to  work  out  in  detail  a
philosophy of mind based on evolutionary principles. Moreover, since they were
familiar  with  classical  ideas  in  the  field,  they  were  able  to  assess  the  kinds  of
changes in those ideas which evolutionary principles required. (Goudge 1973: 133)
Similarly, British Emergentism comes from an evolutionary background.20 With their
“emergent”  view  of  evolution,  they  try  to  preserve  the  continuity/discontinuity
between  levels:  inorganic/organic,  organic/psychical,  etc.  In  Lloyd  Morgan’s  own
words:
Evolution, in the broad sense of the world, is the name we give to the comprehensive
plan of sequence in all natural events.
But  the orderly  sequence,  historically  viewed,  appears  to  present,  from time to
time, something genuinely new. Under what I here call emergent evolution, stress is
laid on this incoming of the new. (Lloyd Morgan 1923: 1; italics mine)
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This emphasis  on the concept of  the incoming of  the new, and more generally the
philosophical  question  of  how  to  think  the  relationship  between  continuity  and
discontinuity,  it  is  not  only  confined  to  the  emergence  of  mind,  but  represents  a
categorical and metaphysical problem per se.
(b) Novelty .  This general problem of “the incoming of the new,” so fundamental for
British Emergentism, can be viewed as primary also for  pragmatism, so that  it  can
count  as  the  second  common  trait.  If  I  have  already  stressed  (cf.  the  previous
paragraph) the importance of “novelty” for Mead through Dewey’s words, consider also
Schiller’s Presidential Address of the Aristotelian Society of 1921, which is almost entirely
devoted to the philosophical problem of novelty;21 or, even before, James’s posthumous
book Some Problems of Philosophy,  whose last five chapters were dedicated to novelty
(James 1911: 147-220).22 
For his  part,  Dewey also adopts the word “novelty” – whose use is  so rare in both
ordinary English and “philosophical” English to be considered almost a technicality – in
his  books.  He  defines  it  as  the  “emergence  of  unexpected  and  unpredictable
combinations” (Dewey 1925: 281), in a sense perfectly coincident with the emergentist
meaning of the word. Accordingly, if the conception of mind in evolution is the most
relevant  and  specific  issue  that  emergentism  and  classical  pragmatism  have  in
common, the relevance of novelty and the occurrence of the new is the more general
trait  they  share.  Indeed,  the  emergence  of  mind  is  circumscribed  in  this  anti-
mechanistic  view of  evolution that  more generally  gives  room to development and
change, and especially to irreducible novelty.
 
2.2.2. Pragmatism’s Criticism of Emergentism
All  the  same,  Dewey  and  Schiller  were  not  fully  satisfied  with  the  concept  of
emergence, as El-Hani and Pihlström have underlined, nor can we say that classical
pragmatists’ claims can be fully identified with those of emergentism.23 On the whole,
the  classical  pragmatists’  critiques  can  be  abridged  in  a  recent  quote  by  another
famous, contemporary pragmatist, Hilary Putnam. With reference to consciousness, in
1999 he spoke of emergence as a “bad metaphor”: 
It is a bad metaphor because it suggests that all the true statements expressible in
the vocabulary of the “basic” sciences of physics, chemistry, biology […] might have
been true without there being consciousness or intentionality. In short, it suggests
that  we  might  conceivably  have  all  been Automatic  Sweethearts,  and  that  it  is
“mysterious” that we aren’t. (Putnam 1999: 174)
Also from a classical, pragmatist viewpoint we can say: (a) on the one hand that it is “a
bad  metaphor”  because  of  the  “magical”  tone  that  ultimately  retains  the  idea  of
“emergence” (cf. also Dewey, Bentley 1949 [1989]: 45, 121),24 so that it becomes a way of
“blocking the way of inquiry,” to quote Peirce’s famous motto, on issues so fundamental
as the mind-body relation; (b) on the other hand, “emergence” is “a bad metaphor”
because it assumes that the primary level of reality is always there, independent from
us,  “ready-made,”  undisputed,  and uncritically  accepted (cf.  in  this  regard,  Schiller
1930:  32).  This  second  aspect  has  many  metaphysical  and  ontological  facets.  For
instance, as Pihlström pinpointed (Pilhström 2002: 155), it implies the whole debate of
realism,  which  is  the  controversy  of  the  universals  (and  accordingly  the  status  of
properties). To put it shortly, we could ask: what ontological scheme can be adopted to
justify and explain something like an emergent property? Or – with reference to the
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more limited issue considered in the present paper – what categories should we assume
in order to think an “emergent evolution”? On those answers depends also the prospect
of solution or the clarification of the problem of downward causation, which we saw in
§1 is still today one of the most problematic aspects of emergentism. Furthermore, we
know  that  pragmatic  realism  is  at  once  “an  inherently  pluralistic  and  anti-
reductionistic position” (El-Hani & Pihlström 2002: 24), and – as is especially the case
for Peirce’s pragmaticism – a continuistic standpoint.
 
3. Missed Connections and Common Roots: British
Emergentism and Peirce
If we now restrict our analyses to Peirce, at first glance it seems difficult to make a
comparison.  As  it  has  been  recalled  in  §2.1,  Peirce  could  not  be  a  witness  to  the
flourishing of  British Emergentism.  On what  elements,  then,  does  it  make sense to
speak of an “emergentist” reading of Peirce? For the sake of clarity, I will develop my
investigation in two different perspectives, as I did in the previous paragraph more
generally:  the first  is  more critical-historical,  while  the second is  more theoretical-
speculative.  Indeed,  although  there  is  no  apparent  connections  between  Charles
Sanders Peirce and British Emergentists, they have many common roots.
 
3.1. A Matter of “British” Influence
Some scholars trace back “emergentism” to Ancient Greek thought and especially to
Aristotle  (cf.  Caston  1997).  Nonetheless,  limiting  the  present  investigation  to  the
development  of  an  “explicit”  emergentist  thought,  it  is  worthwhile  to  note  that
Emergentism  of  the  twenties  has  its  own  roots  in  British  thought.  As  McLaughlin
clearly indicates:
This  tradition  [of  British  Emergentism]  began  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth
century and flourished in the first quarter of this century. It began with John Stuart
Mill’s  System  of  Logic (1843),  and  traced  through  Alexander  Bain’s  Logic  (1870),
George Henry Lewes’s Problems of Life and Mind (1875). (McLaughlin 1992: 49)
Thus, the reason why McLaughlin indicated John Stuart Mill,  Bain and Lewes as the
fathers of emergentism is not merely a matter of historical reconstruction. Although
none of them would call themself “emergentist,” they are mentioned in the works of
British Emergentists as the first thinkers of the notion of “emergence.” For instance,
consider the beginning of Lloyd Morgan’s Emergent evolution:25
The concept of emergence was dealt with (to go no further back) by J. S. Mill in his
Logic (Bk. III, Ch. vi, §2) under the discussion of “heteropathic laws” in causation.
The word “emergent,” as contrasted with “resultant,” was suggested by G. H. Lewes
in his Problems of Life and Mind (Vol. II, Prob. V, Ch. iii, p. 412). Both adduce examples
from chemistry and from physiology; both deal with properties; both distinguish
those properties (a) which are additive and subtractive only, and predictable, from
those (b) which are new and unpredictable; both insist on the claim that the latter
no less than the former fall under the rubric of universal causation. (Morgan Lloyd
1923: 2-3)
If we then turn to C. S. Peirce, the role played by all those authors in the development
of his pragmatism is well  known,26 and it  is  worthwhile to note that none of those
authors, neither Stuart Mill, nor Bain, nor Lewes, had technical training in biology or
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natural sciences. Peirce refers to them as logicians. Their primary concern and field of
research  was  indeed  that  of  logic,  which  was  also  of  supreme  interest  for  Peirce.
Besides, it is not a coincidence that British Emergentism (cf. the above quotation by
Lloyd Morgan) is not based so much on biological evidence. Rather it addresses the
issue  of  the  logic of  the  universe,  and  it  seeks  new  conceptions,  such  as  that  of
emergence,  or  a  logical  framework,  in  which  both  continuity  and  novelty  can  be
admitted at  once.  Only  in  this  way it  is  indeed possible  to  gain  a  new idea  of  the
relationship between different realms of reality, one that works scientifically and is
able to explain all natural phenomena, mind included. 
To enlighten the logical side of emergent evolution might sound curious today, but this
association between logic and evolutionary theories was not uncommon at all during
the 19th century and the early decades of the 20th century. It is sufficient to remember
on the one hand that, as stated before, Lloyd Morgan borrowed the idea of emergence
from Stuart Mill’s System of Logic, and, on the other hand, Peirce’s “logical” appraisal of
Darwin. To shed more light on the latter aspect, which has not yet been investigated, I
will  now  analyze  what  can  be  considered  the  second  common  root  of  British
Emergentism  and  Peirce:  the  evolutionary  thought  of  Charles  Darwin  and  Herbert
Spencer.
 
3.2. For a “Thorough-going Evolutionism”: with Darwin beyond
Spencer 
Generally  speaking,  British  Emergentism  can  be  located  in  between  Darwin’s  and
Spencer’s theories. As Peter A. Corning summarizes:
Many theorists of that era viewed Darwin’s explanation as unsatisfactory, or at least
incomplete,  and emergent evolution theory was advanced as a way to reconcile
Darwin’s  gradualism  with  the  appearance  of  qualitative  novelties  and,  equally
important,  with  Herbert  Spencer’s  notion  (following  Lamarck)  of  an  inherent,
energy-driven trend in evolution toward new levels of organization. (Corning 2012:
297-8)27 
This notion of an “energy-driven trend in evolution,” as we will see in §4, is also a
feature characterizing Peirce’s evolutionary thought. But the first aspect mentioned in
the  quoted  passage  should  be  not  overlooked.  Indeed,  on  the  one  hand,  British
Emergentism tried to “correct” Darwin’s gradualism with Spencer’s “energy-trend in
evolution towards new level of organization,” and, on the other hand, to state that they
combined Darwin’s gradualism with the appearance of qualitative novelties means that
they proposed and promoted a  non-mechanistic  view of  evolution and the cosmos.
Lloyd Morgan pointed it out clearly in the first chapter of Emergent evolution:
[…] the whole doctrine of emergentism is a continued protest against mechanical
interpretation […]. The essential feature of a mechanical – or, if it be preferred, a
mechanistic  –  interpretation  is  that  it  is  in  terms  of  resultant  effects  only,
calculable by algebraic summation. It ignores that something more that must be
accepted  as  emergent.  […]  Against  such  a  mechanical  interpretation  –  such  a
mechanistic dogma – emergent evolution rises in protest. The gist of its contention
is that such interpretation is quite inadequate. Resultants there are; but there is
emergence also. (Morgan Lloyd 1923: 7-8)
Accordingly,  this  anti-mechanistic  feature  makes  British  Emergentism  stand  out
against Spencer. While taking the stance of Spencer in facing Bergson’s objections to
Spencer’s  “reductionism,”  Lloyd  Morgan  himself  admits,  in  his  1913’s  “Herbert
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Spencer’s lecture,” that “Spencer tried to reduce all kinds of relatedness to one quasi-
mechanical  type;  and he  signally  failed  –  or  shall  I  say  that  he  succeeded only  by
ignoring all the specific differences […]” (Morgan Lloyd 1913: 18). As a consequence,
British Emergentism of the early 20th century was strongly influenced and inspired
both  by  Darwin’s  and  Spencer’s  evolutionisms,  but,  all  the  same,  plainly  aimed  at
overcoming the limitations and weaknesses of the previous viewpoints. Again, overall
Darwin’s and Spencer’s explanations seemed to lack an explanation for the incoming of
the new in evolution.
Even Peirce can be construed as a “critical” appraiser of both Darwin and Spencer,
insofar as he develops his own evolutionary thought as a radicalization and correction
of their prominent and most common views of evolution. However, since the attention
is  usually  focused  only  on  their  opposition  (especially  for  Peirce  vs.  Darwin)  by
secondary  literature,  it  is  necessary  to  offer  a  more  in-depth  analysis  on  those
comparisons than the one just offered for British Emergentism.
 
3.2.1. Peirce and Darwin
To investigate the connections between Peirce and evolutionary theories, his famous
quote:  “Philosophy  requires  thorough-going  evolutionism or  none”  (W8:  102,  1890)
immediately  gives  an  idea  of  the  fundamental  relationship  that,  according  to  him,
evolution and philosophy have in general and especially for Peirce’s own philosophy.
But  to  what  extent  is  he  actually  referring  to  Darwin  when  speaking  about
evolutionism? In fact, Peirce explicitly says that “Everybody today is evolutionist. This
is said to be the day of evolutionism” (NEM 4: 140; R 942, 1896). 
First of all, the young Peirce, together with William James and others, but especially
Chauncey Wright,28 discussed Darwin’s The Origin of Species in “The Metaphysical Club” 
(1872).  But  it  is  notorious  that  Peirce  had  a  quarrel  with  Wright  on  the  general
interpretation to attribute to Darwin’s magnum opus. Furthermore, generally speaking,
Peirce maintained a critical attitude towards Darwin, and this is probably due to the
influence  of  Louis  Agassiz  –  one  of  the  most  determined  opponents  of  Darwin  in
America, as some scholars have shown (cf. Wiener 1949, Skagestad 1979). Often Peirce’s
evolutionism is promptly classified as neo-Lamarckian (cf. for instance Reynolds 2002:
99) and, for this reason, immediately set aside as an unsupported theory. 
In the light of these preliminary remarks, at first glance Peirce’s evolutionary theory
might  be  interpreted  as  far-off,  or  even  contrary,  to  Darwin’s  thought.
Notwithstanding,  in  the  passages  where  Peirce  examines  Darwin’s  very  idea  of
evolution, the truth of the matter is quite the opposite. For instance, Peirce wrote in
Design and Chance: “My opinion is only Darwinism analyzed, generalized, and brought
into the realm of Ontology.” (W4: 552, 1884). As a consequence, taking into account
such a radical, clear-cut, and unambiguous statement, Peirce’s debt to Darwin seems, at
least provisionally, clear and forceful. Therefore, Peirce’s evolutionary thought must
have drawn inspiration from Darwin, and, as a consequence, according to my view all
the  differences  between  the  two  authors  must  be  construed  from  within  this
perspective of influence and proximity. Let me first consider in detail  – taking into
account this unequivocal, programmatic purpose of Peirce (to analyze, generalize, and
bring Darwinism into ontology) – the reasons why he esteemed Darwin, so far as to
identify with Darwinism or even to propose to expand it into ontology.
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The  first  reason  why  Peirce  was  committed  to  Darwinism,  the  primary  and  most
general one, is the relevance that Darwinism has for logic. As it was for emergentism,
this assertion may sound paradoxical, but for Peirce to support evolutionism means in
the  first  place  to  recognize  the  fundamental  role  that  statistics,  probability  and
fallibilism, play together in knowledge. Peirce states: “The Darwinian controversy is, in
large part, a question of logic. Mr. Darwin proposed to apply the statistical method to
biology.”  (W3:  244,  1877).  Later,  in  The  Architecture  of  Theories,  Peirce  once  again
emphasizes the relation of Darwinism, logic, and statistics,  when he talks about the
Darwinian principle and the law of large numbers. He affirms:
This Darwinian principle is plainly capable of great generalization. Wherever there
are  large  numbers  of  objects,  having  a  tendency  to  retain  certain  characters
unaltered, this tendency, however, not being absolute but giving room for chance
variations,  then […] there will  be a gradual tendency to change in directions of
departure from them. (W8: 102, 1890)29
Here we can detect the second fundamental reason why Peirce has a high esteem of
Darwinism: the role preserved for chance or spontaneity in this system of thought. He
stresses this  feature,  for instance in The Doctrine  of  Necessity  Examined,  as  follows in
regard to his evolutionary thought: 
By thus admitting pure spontaneity or life as a character of the universe, acting
always and everywhere though restrained within narrow bounds by law, producing
infinitesimal  departures  from  law  continually,  and  great  ones  with  infinite
infrequency, I account for all the variety and diversity of the universe, in the only
sense in which the really sui generis and new can be said to be accounted for. (W8:
122, 1891)
This general account of the universe as a place where spontaneity, chance, or novelty is
acting “always and everywhere” belongs under the label of the doctrine of “tychism” or
“tychasm” (from the Greek Τύχη, chance), as Peirce calls it.30 This represents the key-
concept for a thorough-going evolutionism, that is, for an evolutionary thought that
can also explain and encompass laws and their evolution,31 which is representative of
Peirce’s own thought. In this regard, too, he refers again to Darwin as a prominent
source of inspiration: 
It would seem [...] that through biological studies science may be led to modify the
existing  mechanical  theory  of  the  universe,  which  is  not  at  all  requisite  to  its
progress, but is merely the coloring which scientific thought acquired during the
period  beginning  with  Galileo  and  ending  with  Helmholtz’s  great  dynamical
memoir, when mechanics and allied branches of physics were the chief subjects of
thought, and which in the new period that opened with Darwin is already beginning
to be corrected. Many biologists are pleading today for the admission of genuine
spontaneity. (N1, 176)
To this extent,  that is,  to the acknowledgment of chance as a primary and essential
component of the universe, Peirce and Darwin are allied and not in opposition at all.
The differences between their understandings of the universe will especially emerge in
the final essay of the The Monist series of the 1890s, Evolutionary love,32 and pivot around
the rendering of the evolution of the universe and the role assumed by chance within it
(cf. §4). However, their proximity gets even closer when we analyze Peirce’s criticisms
towards Spencer.
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3.2.2. Peirce and Spencer
Peirce’s  quarrel  with  Herbert  Spencer,  and  more  generally  with  the  doctrine  of
necessity or Necessitarianism, began in 1887 (cf. W6: 61-4) and continues until the end
of his life. It is connected to the reason why Peirce appreciates Darwin’s very idea of
evolution and concerns Spencer’s  mechanical  view of  the universe.  It  is  indeed the
same reason why Peirce charges Spencer for not being a thorough-going evolutionist,
or – in other words – radical enough in his evolutionism. 
For Peirce the difference between his evolutionary standpoint and Spencer lies in the
fact that the latter restricts “evolution to certain elements of the universe, and gives it
a merely secondary position as a corollary of physical law of the ‘persistence of force’,
thus making that law something absolutely inexplicable and inscrutable […].” (NEM 4:
141,  R 942,  1896). On the contrary,  for Peirce laws are not absolute or inexplicable:
every existent element of the universe must be evolved, and we can investigate their
evolution. In a nutshell, for Peirce natural laws are historical products that are liable to
evolution.33 As he remarks in The Architecture of Theories: the laws of nature are “results
of  evolution.  This  supposes them not  to be absolute,  not  to  be obeyed precisely.  It
makes an element of indeterminacy, spontaneity, or absolute chance in nature.” (W8:
101, 1890). Not only must we admit “an element of indeterminacy” in nature to account
for them, but this element of indeterminacy is in fact the only one that can account for
growth  and  diversification.  Indeed,  how  could  a  mechanical  law  produce
diversification, variety, and heterogeneity?34 
Accordingly, after the historical reconstruction of the relationships of influence and
divergence carried out in this paragraph, we can infer that, although Peirce was not
familiar with British Emergentists, he shares with most of them a great acquaintance
with the British logicians of the 20th century, who first came up with the concept of
“emergence.” He also shares with them a very similar awareness and perception of the
path opened by Darwinism – its  great potentiality,  as well  as its  limits and further
developments. On the basis of those similarities and shared concerns, I will offer in the
last part of this article an emergentist reading of Peirce’s evolutionary thought, not in
the sense of reducing Peirce to British Emergentism or vice-versa, but providing a line
of  interpretation  of  Peirce’s  evolutionary  thought  that  is  compatible  with  an
emergentist viewpoint, or at least alternative to it.  In other words, I will show how
Peirce’s  evolutionary  thought  offers  a  valid  response  to  the  same  problems  that
emergentism tries to address and answer.
 
4. An “Emergentist” Reading of Peirce’s Evolutionary
Thought
Although  Thomas A.  Goudge,  in  his  1973  pioneering  study  on  pragmatism  and  the
evolutionary view of mind, set aside Peirce by simply stating that he “gives priority of
continuity” and “does not introduce the idea of emergence at all, but rather employs
the idea of ‘pure spontaneity’” (Goudge 1973: 144), the hints of emergentism in Peirce’s
thought, as well as the feasibility of comparison between his pragmaticism and British
Emergentism, have recently been supported by many scholars. Among them, the first
who has  noted Peirce’s  and emergentism’s  proximity  is  Ian Hacking,  who states  in
reference to The Monist series of the 90s that Peirce puts “emergentism together with
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ideas of statistical mechanics, to form a new and vigorous indeterminism” (Hacking
1983:  468).  From  that  time  onwards,  comparative  studies  have  been  increasing,
especially  in  the  last  decades.  Among  others,  see  for  instance  Claudine  Tiercelin’s
comparison between the irreducibility of higher-level properties and the irreducibility
of Thirdness (Tiercelin 1998: 13-8), or – more recently – Queiroz’s and El Hani’s article
on “Semiosis as an Emergent Process” (Queiroz & El Hani 2006).  Furthermore, even
more  relevant  with  regard  to  the  present  article,  since  I  focus  on  the  concept  of
emergent evolution,35 see Philip Rose’s essay on “C. S. Peirce’s Cosmogonic Philosophy of
Emergent Evolution” (Rose 2016),  where a  detailed,  emergentist  analysis  of  Peirce’s
development of the universe from its very beginning is carried out with success. I will
now provide an emergentist reading of Peirce’s evolutionary thought that is not based
on his cosmogony, but rather on his categorical cosmology (that is, on his universal
categories that the author uses to describe all the features of the universe) and his own
“emergentist” understanding of  the dynamics of  evolution,  which characterizes  the
universe at large and is still operating today.
 
4.1. The Place of Novelty in Peirce’s Universe
In paragraph §2.2.1. it has already been underlined that the pivotal topic for British
Emergentism is to allow the occurrence of novelty in an evolutionary framework, and
that  the  very  concept  of  emergence  addresses  this  issue  exactly.  Furthermore,  in
paragraph §3.2.1., it is apparent from the comparison between Peirce and Darwin that
Peirce strongly claimed a place for novelty in the universe, under the label of chance or
spontaneity.  But  what  is  the  relevance  of  such  a  novelty  within  Peirce’s  own
philosophy? And how did he conceive it? 
To answer this question, the first point to mark is that according to Peirce speaking of
chance does not mean a return to some sort of vitalism. For him chance represents a
way  of  appealing  to  novelty  via  statistics  and  also  probability.  As  Peirce  himself
specifies in 1898 (The Logic of Continuity, Reasoning and the Logic of Things), “When I speak
of  chance,  I  only  employ  a  mathematical  term  to  express  with  accuracy  the
characteristics of freedom or spontaneity” (RLT: 261, 1898). The reasons why he insists
that  novelty,  as  chance,  must  be  admitted  into  any  account  of  the  universe  are
summarized in four “positive arguments”: (a) the prevalence of growth as opposed to
the conservation of energy; (b) the variety present in the universe; (c) feeling; and (d)
the explanation of law (cf. §3.2.2.) (CP: 6.613, 1893). 
Taking into account the role assigned by Peirce to chance, and that Darwinism is a kind
of tychism (cf. §3.2.1.) – that is, an evolution by chance – we could tend to think that
Peirce’s  evolutionary  hypothesis  is  that  of  tychism  too.  However,  even  if  Peirce
continues to insist until the end of his life on chance as a real factor of the universe (cf.
R 200, CP 6.322, c. 1908), his standpoint is more elaborated, because he explicitly refuses
the  label  of  “tychism”  or  “tychasm”  for  his  own  philosophy.  Thus,  in  order  to
understand better his own position as favorable to chance but not reducible to tychism,
it can be helpful to follow again the comparison with Darwin to see where Peirce’s view
diverges.
Indeed, although the year before, in The Architecture of Theories, Peirce’s interpretation
of Darwinism was quite generous, in Evolutionary Love he considers Darwin only to the
extent that the latter represents an eminent instance of a certain egoistic, political-
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economical perspective, which Peirce believes is dominant in the 19th century. In this
sense, Peirce states that [Darwin’s] hypothesis was “without dispute one of the most
ingenious and pretty ever devised,” “but the extraordinarily favorable reception it met
with was […] because of the encouragement it gave to the greed-philosophy” (W8: 191,
1982).36 In this regard, the point he criticized the most was that of natural selection,
conceived of “the survival of the fittest.”37 But the other reason – a more general one –
why Peirce dissociates himself from Darwin in this article is that he clearly rejects what
he calls tychasm, or – better yet – tychastic evolution, that is, evolution by fortuitous
variation, or chance. 
But how is that possible, given the relevance Peirce attributes to chance? In the answer
to  this  question  lies  the  great  affinity  of  Peirce  and  British  Emergentism.  But,  to
understand this apparently shift of mind with regard to Darwin, I must first introduce
and briefly touch upon the three possible modes of evolution that Peirce pointed out in
Evolutionary Love.38
 
4.2. Emergence as Novelty in Evolution: Evolutionary Love
According  to  Peirce  we  can  detect  three  different  kinds  of  evolution:  tychastic
evolution,  or  tychasm,  anancastic  evolution,  or  anancasm (from  the  Greek  ἀνάγκη,
necessity), and agapastic evolution or agapasm (from the Greek ἀγάπη, cherishing love).
Roughly  speaking,  the  first  is  evolution  “by  fortuitous  variation,”  the  second  is
evolution  by  “mechanical  necessity,”  and  the  third  is  evolution  by  what  he  calls
“creative love” (W8: 194). The correspondence is apparent between those three kinds
and  Peirce’s  three categories,  or  –  as  he  defines  them  –  his  three  “important
metaphysico-cosmical  elements” (EP2:  164,  1903).  Namely,  Firstness (that  stands for
chance,  spontaneity,  freedom),  Secondness  (referring  to  reaction,  brute  facts),  and
Thirdness (that stands for the category of habits and continuity). Peirce himself affirms
that agapasm “is the sort of evolution which every careful student of my essay “The Law
of Mind” must see that synechism calls for” (W8: 186).39
More in detail, tychastic evolution is “a mode of evolution in which the only positive
agent of change in the whole passage from moner to man is fortuitous variation” (W8:
190). Ananchastic evolution, or evolution by mechanical necessity, consists mainly in the
“development under the pressure of external circumstances” (W8: 199), such as natural
catastrophes, as is suggested for instance by Clarence King. In other words, we speak of
ananchasm for  every  theory  that  attributes  “all  progress  to  an  inward  necessary
principle, or other form of necessity” (W8: 191).
However, before moving to the account of agapasm, it is worthwhile to note that even in
this essay Peirce does not deny the importance and role of chance. It is in this essay in
fact where the famous expression “chance begets order” (W8: 190) is found. Thus, far
from repudiating chance, Peirce calls into question the fact that it is the only “positive
agent” of growth and evolution. As he states: “In genuine agapasm […] advance takes
place by virtue of a positive sympathy among the created springing from continuity of
mind.  This  is  the  idea  which  tychasticism  knows  not  how  to  manage.”  (W8:  195).
Accordingly, for Peirce the limit of tychasm, of evolution by chance, is that it fails to
give an account of continuity, of sympathy, and of the creative power of love itself.
Instead,  agapasm does  encompass  chance,  but  assigns  to  it  a  role  subsidiary  to  the
propulsive movement proper to love. 
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More in detail, for Peirce tychasm cannot explain the “vital freedom which is the breath
of the spirit of love” (W8: 195),  or – more in detail  – “the bestowal of spontaneous
energy by the parent upon the offspring, and, second, […] the disposition of the latter
to catch the general idea of those about it and thus to subserve the general purpose”
(W8: 194). From those passages, the profound connection between love and continuity
is announced: love and sympathy testify to continuity and represent the only feasible
path for continuity to evolve and grow, making something new emerge. Accordingly,
we find a new kind of novelty here: one that is not merely coincident with chance but
also brought about by continuity, through love. For this reason agape, cherishing love,
seems to Peirce the best  option for synechism: it  is  what makes the evolution of  a
continuous world conceivable. More in detail, Peirce describes this movement of love as
circular: “The movement of love is circular, at one and the same impulse projecting
creations  into  independency  and  drawing  them  into  harmony”  (W8:  185).  This
movement is twofold: on the one hand, it “projects creations into independency,” it
makes novelties happen, and, on the other hand, it drives them to harmony.40
Therefore we face two kinds of novelty in Peirce’s evolutionary thought. The first one is
chance or pure spontaneity, that is, novelty conceived per se, in its own originality and
pureness. But there is another kind of novelty in nature: one that is made possible only
through  the  vital  continuity  of  the  cosmos.  If  the  common  way  of  understanding
continuity is one that excludes novelty or emergence (cf. for instance Goudge 1973),
Peirce’s  concept  of  continuity,  and  especially  of  agapastic evolution,  discloses  a
different  possibility.  For  Peirce,  continuous  evolution  is  not  subjugated  to  any
mechanical law, and in this sense it can be viewed as open to novelty. But Peirce does
not  limit  it,  he  goes  further  when  he  speaks  of  the  propulsive  power  of  love  and
agapasm. 
Indeed, the fact that agapastic evolution admits and implies chance without recognizing
it as the main agency of evolution means that Peirce associates a new “kind of novelty”
with creative love, one that is not at all reducible to Firstness. Peirce describes this
creative  side  of  agapasm by  opposing  tychasm to  genuine  agapasm.  He  states,  “in  a
genuine agapasm […] advance takes place by virtue of a positive sympathy among the
created  springing  from continuity  of  mind”  (W8:  195).  Thus,  it  is  evident  that  the
advance of  the universe is  not to be attributed to chance but to sympathy.  Chance
exists and operates in nature – there is  always room for arbitrariness and absolute
originality – but what makes the universe grow is this projecting impulse of love, its
creative power. Peirce describes sympathy in these pages as surrounding the whole
universe. 
As a consequence, if he states that “once you have embraced the principle of continuity
no kind of explanation of things will satisfy you except that they grew” (CP 1.175, 1893),
it must be highlighted that until agapasm is taken into account it is hard to explain how
they grow. In this way, Peirce’s description of love offers an explanation or at least a
hypothesis that explains these indisputable elements of experience and nature, such as
growth and novelty. In short, what Chance (Firstness) cannot account for is the kind of
novelty that continuity carries with it, that is, “the vital freedom which is the breath of
the spirit of love” (W8: 195). This theory of agapastic evolution is really akin to British
Emergentism, or at least can be considered as an emergent theory, because it points
exactly to that peculiar intertwinement of continuity and novelty that emergence is. In
fact, this agapastic view of evolution offers a “positive” description of emergence, that
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is, of how novelty has been brought about. It also offers a new conceptual model for
understanding “downward causation,” since in Peirce’s view Thirdness always implies a
“return-effect” on Firstness and Secondness. Indeed, Thirdness needs them to operate
without being reducible to them.41
A final objection to this hypothesis can be raised and must be addressed: agapism can
ultimately be viewed, and is generally viewed, together with Peirce’s sharp criticism of
Darwin’s “Gospel of Greed,” as very suggestive, but unfortunately unscientific and hard
to  support.  (1)  On the first  charge of  being too “poetic” or “anthropomorphic,”  and
unscientific, let me reply with Peirce’s own words, when he says that:
I hear you say: “All that is not fact; it is poetry.” Nonsense! Bad poetry is false, I
grant; but nothing is truer than true poetry. […] Every scientific explanation of a
natural  phenomenon is a  hypothesis  that  there  is  something  in  nature  to  which  the
human reason is analogous; and that it really is so, all the successes of science in its
application to human convenience are witnesses. They proclaim that truth over the
length and breadth of the modern world. (EP2: 193, italics mine, 1903)
(2) With regard to the presumed difficulties in supporting such a position, it seems to
me that even a rapid glance at the most recent studies in evolutionary biology42 makes
us  realize  how  up-to-date  Peirce’s  standpoint  is.  Without  pretending  that  Peirce’s
theory is a biological one, and instead considering it a philosophical and conceptual
framework within which biological standpoints can be founded and developed, see for
instance Martin A. Nowak’s theory, which clearly indicates cooperation as the third
fundamental principle of evolution, along with mutation and selection (cf. Nowak &
Highfield 2012).
As a conclusion, after this historical and theoretical investigation, we can clearly see
how  much  the  “typical  emergentist”  problem  of  the  relationship  between  the
continuity of evolution and the appearance of novelty lies at the very heart of Peirce’s
evolutionary hypothesis (namely, agapasm). In this way, apagasm can pave the way for
an  original,  “positive”  description  of  the  emergence  of  novelty,  and  offers  new
philosophical and conceptual tools to re-think downward causation, thereby opening
new paths of dialogue between philosophy and biology.
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NOTES
*. This  research  was  founded  by  the  Department  of  Philosophy  “Piero  Martinetti”  of  the
University of  Milan under the Project “Department of  Excellence 2018-2022” awarded by the
Ministry of Education, University and Research (MIUR).
1. Cf. C.S. Peirce, R 408, CSP 173; CP 7.467, 1893. In the cited passage the author defines every
concept as the “the living influence of a diagram or an icon, with whose parts are connected in
thought an equal number of feelings or ideas.”
2. Cf. Kauffman 2019; Seidel & Greve 2017; Corradini & O’Connor 2010; Bedau & Humphreys 2008;
Clayton & Davis 2006; Pihlström 2002; Kim 1999; Stephan 1999; Beckerman, Flohr & Kim 1992.
3. Added by me, in line with Bennett-Hunter’s previous paragraphs.
4. A third possibility can be added in this regard, that of “nominal emergence,” that refers to the
general properties of a system or a complex totality. Thus, with nominal emergent phenomena
we refer to a “macro” property, as opposed to a “micro” property. Due to the rare adoption of
this concept in current debates, I will not take it into account (Cf. Corradini & O’Connor 2010:
48-51). 
5. Bedau & Humphreys (2008: 5). Among the first supporters of the epistemological conception of
emergence see Hempel & Oppenheim 1948.
6. Bunge (2003: 14).
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7. I adopt the very general word “phenomena” to indicate everything we can call “emergent.”
Another key problem of emergentist debates is indeed whether “emergent” are substances, or
qualities, properties, entities, processes, etc.
8. Cf. Bedau (1997: 375-99).
9. Cf. Kim (1999: 20-4). The following list is my synthesis of the claims pointed out by Kim. S and
W indicates if strong (S) or weak (W) emergence supports the tenet described.
10. Samuel  Alexander  is  actually  Australian-born.  Furthermore,  even  if  Rudolph  Metz  in  A
Hundred  Years  of  British  Philosophy affirmed  that  Lloyd  Morgan  and  Alexander  were  the  first
recognized as founders of British Emergentism (cf.  Metz 1938: 653-62), the three of them are
currently  recognized  as  the  British  Emergentism’s  exponents  (cf.  especially  Stephan  1992;
McLaughlin 1992).
11. This  period  corresponds  to  the  third  (of  fourth)  phases  of  the  history  of  emergentism
pinpointed by Stephan: “I call this rather long period the third phase: it starts in 1926 where at
the “Sixth International Congress of Philosophy” theories of emergence were on the rampage
getting  their  own  section  with  lectures  by  Hans Driesch,  “Emergent  Evolution,”  Arthur O.
Lovejoy, “The Meanings of ‘Emergence’ and its Modes,” and W. M. Wheeler, “Emergent Evolution
and the Social.” In the same year the Aristotelian Society organized a symposium on “The Notion
of Emergence.” Speakers were E. S. Russell, C. R. Morris and W. L. Mackenzie. Stephen C. Pepper’s
article “Emergence” was published the same year. In the following decade W. T. Stace, “Novelty,
Indeterminism,  and  Emergence”  (1939),  P. Henle,  “The  Status  of  Emergence”  (1942),  and
G. Bergmann, “Holism, Historicism, and Emergence” (1944) discussed the notion of emergence in
consideration of the presumably related concepts of novelty and non-predictability. Even the
articles of C. W. Berenda, “On Emergence and Prediction” (1953), and A. Pap, “The Concept of
Absolute Emergence” (1952) belong to the third phase. The discussion of emergence came to a
temporary  end  with  the  work  of  C. G. Hempel  and  P. Oppenheim,  “Studies  in  the  Logic  of
Explanation” (1948), and E. Nagel, The Structure of Science (1961)” (Stephan 1992: 26).
12. If we consider also pragmatism outside of the US, Schiller should also be mentioned. Cf. the
following paragraph.
13. James is often cited in their works, from the Principles and later works. In Alexander’s Space,
Time and Deity, he is especially referred to in relation to Alexander’s investigation of categories,
to spatial and temporal relations, the concept of mind and its connection to bodily actions, and
even his notion of “novelty,” a pivotal concept for emergentism (cf. Alexander 1920 vol. i: xx, 94,
107, 113, 116-8, 165-7, 238-9, 247-9; vol. ii: 193, 323-4, 342, 376-8, 407, 423; Lloyd Morgan 1923: xii,
74  –  those  are  quotations  of  James’s  “The  Meaning  of  Truth”  –,  in  addition  we  should  also
consider  James’s  influence  on  Lloyd  Morgan  as  psychologist;  Broad  1925:  118-20  on  James’s
“evolutionary argument” on the action of mind on body and 558, 571 on the unity of the self).
14. On the  relation between pragmatism and emergentism from a  historical  perspective  see
especially Stephan (1999: 134-8); El-Hani & Pihlström 2002; Pihlström 2002; Sawyer 2002; Doat &
Sartenaer 2014; Baggio 2015.
15. As for Dewey, Schiller also has a critical approach to the notion of emergence. He recognizes
its role and function but does not accept it due to its ambiguity. Cf. the following paragraph and
footnote 14.
16. Together with “emergentism,” Murphy also quotes A. N. Whitehead and his speculation, both
epistemological and metaphysical, together with some theories of relativity. With this regard,
Alfred  North  Whitehead  can  be  properly  indicated  as  the  mediating  figure  between  British
Emergentism  and  classical  pragmatists,  that  is,  Dewey  and  above  all  Mead  (cf.  Mead  1932;
Henning, Myers & John 2015).
17. Roughly speaking, to characterize their “emergentism,” we may say that Mead’s emergentism
is distinguishable for its social and linguistic characteristics, since he focuses on the social and
linguistic character of the self. In a nutshell, for Mead the self emerges from the social structure,
Does Continuity Allow For Emergence?
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XI-2 | 2019
20
as  well  as  from  language  (cf.  Mead  1932,  1934).  Dewey’s  emergentism,  instead,  is  basically
connoted  by  a  theory  of  meaning  and  action  as  emergent  from  the  dynamical  interplay  of
environment and subjects (Dewey 1925).
18. Besides, of course, they did make use of the concept of emergence. Goudge specifies: “Dewey
and Mead used the category of emergence. Its negative function was to resist the classical thesis
that  (1)  since  mental  phenomena  now  exist,  they  must  have  been  implicitly  or  potentially
present in evolution from the very start; and (2) their potential presence played an active part in
their  later  realization,  and  was  not  merely  an  abstract  possibility.  Both  constituents  of  the
classical thesis, according to Dewey, are gratuitous assumptions which can be avoided if we take
seriously the continuous cumulative nature of any developmental process, for example, growth
from infancy to maturity.” (Goudge 1973: 142).
19. For the same reason, a “pragmatic turn” (Bernstein 2010; Engel, Friston & Kragic 2016) has
recently  been  identified  in  philosophy  of  mind  and  cognitive  sciences.  Indeed,  against  the
traditional  representational  view  of  cognition,  a  new  action-oriented  paradigm  has  been
privileged in the last  decade,  and the theories of  inactive and extended mind, together with
embodied cognition, are without doubt the closest to pragmatism. Cf. especially Madzia & Jung
2015; Caravà 2015; Fabbrichesi 2016; Viola 2016; Gallagher 2017.
20. Under the strong influence of Henri Bergson, cf. footnote 21.
21. Schiller  states:“[W]e  have  tonight  to  consider  the  most  detested of  subjects,  which runs
odiously counter to every instinct and every habit of every being, animate and inanimate. Even a
desperado like myself would hardly have dared to intrude it upon a gathering of respectable
philosophers, if he could not quote precedents and claim support; if, that is, the greatest of living
metaphysicians had not so effectively pleaded for a revision of the old Eleatic verdict, to which
nearly all philosophers have assented with such uncritical docility and unthinking enthusiasm,
that no place need be made for Novelty in our philosophies, because Novelty is as such ultimately
unthinkable and impossible. Perhaps M. Bergson’s greatest achievement is to have shaken this
prejudice,  and  to  have  made  Novelty  a  good  philosophic  problem.  It  is  no  longer  mere
impertinence to inquire into Novelty, to ask philosophers to recognize its existence, to beg them
to analyse why they hate it and won’t, and to insist that, whether they hate it or not, they have
got to have it. […] Novelty is ineluctable and we are all so constructed as to experience it, and the
world is continually generating it, it may be more reasonable, or at least more sensible, to try to
understand it than to try to ignore it.” (Schiller 1921-22: 1-2). With reference to novelty, Alfred
North Whitehead also had a crucial role for the place assigned to novelty in his philosophy and
cosmology. Indeed, he declares in Process and Reality (1929) that the ultimate of his philosophy is
“creativity,” defined as “the principle of novelty” (Whitehead 1929 [1979]: 21).
22. More in detail, Chapter IX is entitled “The Problem of Novelty,” and there the issue of novelty
is introduced, in connection to some major topics: perception, science, personal experience and
the  infinite;  Chapter X,  “Novelty  and  the  Infinite  –  The  Conceptual  View,”  scrutinizes
discontinuity  and  continuity  theories,  in  particular  Zeno’s,  Kant’s and  Renouvier’s  views;
Chapter XI, “Novelty and the Infinite – The Perceptual View,” undertakes an analysis of the new
concept of the infinite and investigates the perceptual experience of novelty and its conceptual
consequences”; similarly, Chapter XII and XIII (“Novelty and Causation – The Conceptual View,”
“Novelty  and Causation –  The Perceptual  View”)  analyze novelty  and causation both from a
conceptual perspective and a perceptual one; the former chapter takes into account the concepts
of  causality  of  Aristotle,  Scholastics,  Occasionalism,  Leibniz,  Hume,  Kant,  Positivism,  and
deductive theories; and the latter tackles the perceptual experience of causation, with reference
to the arising of novelties. 
23. For  a  more  detailed  analysis  of  pragmatism  (both  classical  and  contemporary)  on
emergentism cf. El-Hani & Pihlström (2002: 26-32); Stephan (1999: 134-8). 
24. Quoted in El-Hani & Pihlström (2002: 28).
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25. However, Bain is clearly not explicitly mentioned here.
26. For J. S. Mill, Peirce’s interest in his logic and scientific methodology, as well as the latter’s
criticism of Mill’s nominalism, is clearly stated from the sixties onwards (cf.  for instance the
Harvard  Lecture  on  Whewell,  Mill,  Compte  in  1865,  but  more  generally  all  the  occurrences
present in both Writings and manuscripts.  Very significant is also how Peirce understood the
connection/opposition between Mill and Darwin (cf. EP2: 158, 1903). For a critical examination on
Mill and Peirce see Smyth 1985. For Bain we face a similar situation, given the massive presence
of references in Peirce’s opus.  Probably his most notorious influence is on the concept of the
pragmatic  maxim.  Cf.  for  instance  R 325,  Pragmatism  made  easy,  (unav.es/gep/
PragmatismMadeEasy.html),  transcribed  by  Juan  Pablo  Serra:  “The  particular  point  that  had
been made by Bain and that had most struck Green, and through him, the rest of us, was the
insistence that what a man really believes is what he would be ready to act upon, and to risk
much upon,” and cf. overall Fisch 1954. The only exception in terms of Peirce’s acquaintance is
probably Lewes, although his work, Problems of Life and Mind is quoted just after Peirce’s entry on
“emergent year” in the Century dictionary (Peirce 1889-1891:  1897).  Besides,  Peirce not  only
quoted Lewes’s work on Aristotle in his lectures on British Logicians (W2: 315, 1869), but carefully
considers Lewes’s standpoint in his “Grand Logic” (cf. R 400, CSP 45, 1893-95), quoting from the
first volume of Lewes’s Problems of Life and Mind.
27. We will tackle again these two elements in the following paragraph, where we will consider in
detail Peirce’s view of evolution, namely agapasm. On Spencer’s account see Blitz (1992: 24-34);
and (ibid.: 94-5) on Lloyd Morgan and Spencer.
28. Cf. Wiener (1949, Chapter 3), and Parravicini 2012.
29. Since Peirce’s approach to Darwin is highly “logical,” I think that a question may naturally
arise:  to  what  extent  does  what  Peirce  said  about  Darwin  really  refer  to  Darwin’s  thought?
Indeed, we might think that the American philosopher is far from the real contents of Darwin’s
thought, but – if we extend our consideration to recent developments of evolutionary biology, or
at least to the modern synthesis, we will surprisingly discover that Peirce was much closer to the
mark than we would have expected. With this regard consider that Ernst Mayr, one of the leading
exponents  of  the  modern synthesis,  in  explaining  why the  “usual  physicalist  ideas”  are  not
applicable  to  biology,  emphasizes  how,  from Darwin  onwards,  biology  needs  (1)  to  abandon
essentialism and typological thinking, (2) to dismiss deterministic laws and accept the absence of
universal laws (in biology), and 3) to reject physicalist reductionism (cf. Mayr 2005: 27).
30. For a more detailed analysis of the relevance of tychism for Peirce see the last paragraph (§4).
31. In  this  regard,  it  is  worthwhile  to  note  how  Peirce  underlines  as  primary  the  logical
soundness of his standpoint. He wrote after the quoted passage: “The superior logic of my view
appears to me not easily controverted.” (W8: 122, 1891). 
32. Cf.  also  Peirce’s  Lowell  Lectures  on the  History  of  Science  (1892)  and the  “Reply  to  the
Necessitarians” (1893).
33. Although such statements do not appear strange today, in the 19th century they are very
uncommon. After relativity,  quantic physics,  and more broadly after the flourishing of  auto-
critical  reflections  by  scientists  in  the  20th century,  we are  indeed quite  accustomed to  the
“relative” and “historical” side of science. But, at that time, by emphasizing these aspects, Peirce
was breaking with the past and with the philosophical tradition. Cf. for instance what Emerson
states  in  Nature,  though  the  power  of  chance  also  receives  considerable  attention  in  his
philosophy: “Any distrust of the permanence of laws, would paralyze the faculties of man. Their
permanence is sacredly respected, and his faith therein is perfect. The wheels and springs of man
are all set to the hypothesis of the permanence of nature.” (Emerson 1836: 48). 
34. On the connection between evolution, natural laws as mechanical,  and fallibilism cf.  also
R 955 CSP 37, CP 1.174, c. 1893: “Evolution means nothing but growth in the widest sense of that
word. Reproduction, of course, is merely one of the incidents of growth. And what is growth? Not
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mere increase. Spencer says it is the passage from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous – or, if
we  prefer  English  to  Spencerese  –  diversification.  […]  And  yet  mechanical  law,  which  the
scientific infallibilist tells us is the only agency of nature, mechanical law can never produce
diversification.” And R 1274a, ISP 8, 1892: “If all things result from evolution then law must be
conceived  as  such  a  result.  But  a  law  which  is  in  process  of  development  is  not  absolute.
Therefore, thoroughgoing evolutionism is essentially & unavoidably hostile to necessitarianism,
as the doctrine that all events are necessary a precise result of law.”
35. Indeed my investigation is limited to the concept of “emergent evolution,” and I did not take
into account, for instance, the emergence of mind.
36. Peirce refers to the “Gospel of Greed” as the general “conviction of the nineteenth century is
that progress takes place by virtue of every individual’s striving for himself with all his might
and trampling his neighbor under foot whenever he gets a chance to do so” (W8: 189).
37. A phrase that, after all, belongs to Spencer and not to Darwin.
38. I chose to focus especially on Evolutionary Love because in my view it represents the best place
where the complexity of Peirce’s standpoint on evolution appears, and where we can understand
more clearly how Peirce’s concept of evolution tries to keep together continuity and creativity,
or novelty.
39. For  an introductory definition of  synechism:  “Materialism is  the  doctrine that  matter  is
everything, idealism the doctrine that ideas are everything, dualism the philosophy which splits
everything in two. In like manner, I have proposed to make synechism mean the tendency to
regard everything as continuous.” (CP 7.565, c.1892); one of the most eminent examples in this
regard is the new synechistic conception of world and mind. Peirce states: “We naturally make all
our distinctions too absolute. We are accustomed to speak of an extend universe and an inner
world of thought. But they are merely vicinities with no real boundary between them.” (R 400,
CSP 78-79, 1893-95).
40. The second part  is  connected to the function of  habit,  another indispensable element of
Peirce’s agapasm, though it cannot substitute the propulsive energy of love. Indeed, the force of
habit  is  what  makes the novelty  effective,  giving a  certain direction to  it.  Cf.  in  this  regard
Peirce’s  clear-cut  disambiguation  when  speaking  of  Lamarck:  W8:  192-3.  I  will  not  consider
Peirce’s  references  to  Lamarck,  not  because  I  overlook  them,  but  because  they  need  a  full,
separate, extensive analysis.
41. As Peirce underlines in 1898: “[…] I chiefly insist upon continuity, or Thirdness, and in order
to secure to Thirdness its really commanding function, I [find it indispensable] that is a third, and
that Firstness,  or chance, and Secondness,  or Brute reaction, are other elements without the
independence of which Thirdness would not have anything upon which to operate.” (R 948, RLT,
261, 1898). 
42. Cf. Nowak & Highfield 2012, but also West, Griffin & Gardner 2007, and Tomasello 2009.
ABSTRACTS
The  present  paper  proposes  an  emergentist  reading  of  Peirce,  with  special  reference  to  his
concept of evolution. Although the author never adopts the word “emergence” in a technical
manner, it  will  be demonstrated that the core problem of emergence lies at the heart of his
evolutionary doctrine, generally displayed by the interplay of his three well-known categories of
Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. Indeed, although the Classical pragmatists most quoted in
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connection to emergentism are Dewey and Mead (and William James to some degree), scholars
have recently suggested some emergentist readings of Peirce’s thought (cf. above all Tiercelin
1998,  Quieroz  & El-Hani  2006,  Rose  2016),  in  particular  with  regard to  semiotic  process  and
cosmogony. Exploring further the path opened by those researches, the present paper aims to
clarify  the  theoretical  problem  of  emergent  evolution  from  a  pragmatist  perspective  and
especially to illustrate Peirce’s emergentist standpoint. In order to reach this goal, the article is
divided into four parts: after (1) a brief introduction to the contemporary debates on emergence,
(2) I give a historical overview of Classical Pragmatism and British Emergentists, (3) with a special
focus on the common roots of the British Emergentists and Peirce on evolution. Finally, (4) I offer
an emergentist  reading of  Peirce’s  theory of  evolution.  In  particular,  I  show how his  strong
emphasis  on  chance  and  the  “growth”  of  the  universe  go  together  with  his  arch-stone  of
synechism (that is his theory of continuity), through what he calls agapasm.
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